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trial, available to persons civilly committed, it does not follow that he
should be judged on the same substantive standards as persons civilly
committed when it is being determined whether he should be com-
mitted at all. This is because of the inherent substantive differences
between the test for incompetency to stand trial and the test for mental
illness.
In light of the additional confusion over the different substantive
tests for commitment generated by the equal protection holding and
the Court's use of questionable precedent as a basis for that holding,
and because the Court's objective could have been accomplished with-
out it, it is this writer's opinion that the due process grounds should
have been the sole basis for the Court's decision in Jackson.
Paul M. Puskar
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-COMPELLED TESTIMONY-
USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY-The United States Supreme
Court has held that use and derivative use immunity is coextensive
with the privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore sufficient
to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, rehearing denied, 408 U.S.
931 (1972).
The petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before the United States
grand jury in the central district of California. Anticipating the peti-
tioners' unwillingness to testify, the Government applied to the district
court for an order pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code,
sections 6002 and 6003,1 which compels a witness to respond to the
1. § 6002. Immunity generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination: but no testimony or other information
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questions of the grand jury in return for a grant of immunity. The
district court granted this order over opposition from the petitioners.2
At the grand jury hearing the petitioners refused to answer questions
and were found to be in contempt of the district court. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 3 the lower court's decision. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to decide whether the use and
derivative use immunity in sections 6002 and 6003 is coextensive with
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.
The Court first looked at the petitioners' contention that no immu-
nity statute is sufficient to compel a person to incriminate himself. This
proposition was dismissed by the Court's reaffirming sixty years of
precedent to the contrary.5
Petitioners' second contention was that the immunity granted in
sections 6002 and 6003 was not sufficient to supplant the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The Court considered
this question the crucial issue of the case and found that the immunity
which was granted under the statute was sufficient because the effect of
the statute's immunity provision is to leave the witness in exactlythe
same position as if he had exercised the privilege against compulsory
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order.
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide
other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for thejudicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for
such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an
order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970).
2. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954, 955 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
3. Id.
4. Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
5. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Shapiro v. United'States, 335 U.S.
1 (1948); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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testimony.6 In finding that the immunity granted these petitioners was
adequate, the Court decided that the petitioners were not justified in
refusing to answer the grand jury's questions after having received the
immunity.
The Court demonstrated that statutory and case law interacted his.
torically, resulting in numerous transactional7 federal immunity stat-
utes until 1970 when Congress enacted sections 6002 and 6003.8 The
new statute was held 9 in Kastigar to be coextensive with the fifth amend-
ment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its grant of
use and derivative use1O immunity.
The Court reasoned that an immunity statute must grant, to a party
who is compelled to testify, protection which is as broad as the privilege
against compelled testimony. The Court relied heavily on Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission" which held that a state witness could not be
compelled to give testimony which might be -incriminating under
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits could not be
used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal
prosecution against him.1 2 Sections 6002 and 6003 were shown by the
Kastigar Court to have the object of putting the witness in the same
position as if he had claimed the privilege under the fifth amendment. 3
Therefore, the Court reasoned, transactional immunity was unduly
broad and wasteful since the lesser quantum of immunity, use and
derivative use, was sufficiently coextensive with the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. By adopting sections 6002 and 6003 as
the proper immunity to be granted, the Court did not specifically over-
rule the transactional statutes and case law but merely narrowed this
area of the law to the point where use and derivative use statutes are
adequate . 4
The first federal immunity statute in the United States was enacted
in 1857.15 This statute granted an overly broad immunity for any fact
6. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59, rehearing denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
7. Transactional immunity is absolute immunity from future prosecution for the
crime to which the testimony relates.
8. 406 U.S. at 449-52.
9. Id. at 453.
10. Use and derivative use immunity means that the particular testimony and evidence
obtained therefrom cannot be utilized to prosecute the witness in a future criminal pro-
ceeding.
11. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
12. Id. at 79.
13. 406 U.S. at 458-59.
14. Id. at 453.
15. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. XIX, 11 Stat. 155. The entire origin of the fifth amendment
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or any act testified to before a congressional committee, not merely for
the offence being referred to by the questioning body.16 The Immunity
Act of 186217 amended the Act of 1857 by replacing the earlier act's
broad grant of immunity with a species of use immunity which was
much narrower than the 1857 immunity. The reason for the 1862
statute was to protect against the abuses of the 1857 statute under which
witnesses were being called before congressional committees and wal-
lowing in the statute's immunity bath by testifying to all crimes com-
mitted by them to protect themselves from future prosecution.' In
1868, another statute extended the use immunity of the 1862 statute to
cover any testimony given in a judicial proceeding.' 9 Another federal
immunity statute was passed in 1887 which pertained to interstate
commerce and this statute simply restated the immunity principle of
the 1868 statute. 20 In Counselman v. Hitchcock2' the Court stated that
the use-type immunity granted in the 1868 statute was an abridgement
of the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 22
The use immunity granted under this statute was held not to be
sufficient to supplant the privilege against compelled testimony because
it did not prevent the use of this testimony to search out other evidence
to be used against the party who was compelled to testify.23 The Court
in Counselman stated that no statute leaving the party subject to prose-
cution after he answers the incriminating questions can have the effect
of adequately replacing the constitutional privilege. 24
In response to the Counselman decision of 1892 the Congress passed
a new statute the following year2 5 which was the first transactional
immunity statute.2 6 The case of Brown v. Walker27 upheld the 1893
privilege is far beyond the scope of this note. For a detailed account of this subject see
L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
16. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. XIX, 11 Stat. 155.
17. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. XI, 12 Stat. 333.
18. Comment, Compulsory Immunity Legislation: Title 11 of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 91, 95.
19. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. XIII, 15 Stat. 37.
20. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
21. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
22. Id. at 585.
23. Id. at 564.
24. Id. at 585.
25. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
26. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify,
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise . ...
Id.
27. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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statute28 and in doing so affirmed the Counselman standard (immunity
must be broad enough to replace the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination). This Counselman standard was upheld for seventy years
until the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission2 9 held that full
transactional immunity was not necessary.3
0
In 1970 when Congress drafted sections 6002 and 6003, it intended
to reflect the use immunity concept of Murphy rather than the trans-
actional concept called for by Counselman.3 1 This statute was said to
give the Government the unique ability to give the witness all that he
is guaranteed under the Constitution (use and derivative use immunity)
so that he will neither invoke the constitutional privilege frivolously
nor shield other parties leaving the Government impotent.3 2 Because
courts of appeals have disagreed 33 as to the constitutionality of sections
6002 and 6003 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided in
Kastigar that the immunity granted in the 1970 statute is coextensive
with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.3 4
. In upholding the statute, Kastigar redefined the quantum of immu-
nity necessary to replace the witness' privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. It is clear, after Kastigar, that to :compel a witness to
testify after that witness has invoked the fifth amendment privilege,
the Government need only grant use and derivative use immunity pur-
suant to sections 6002 and 6003.35
In Kastigar, for the first time, the Court squarely faced the question
of whether transactional immunity or use and derivative use immunity
was constitutionally required. The Court earlier required only use and
derivative use immunity in Murphy, a forerunner to Kastigar, but that
case can be distinguished because its main thrust was to resolve the dual
28. While the constitutional privilege in question is justly regarded as one of the
most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the
statutory immunity, and we are, therefore, of the opinion that the witness was
compellable to answer, and that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Id. at 610.
29. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
30. [W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be
compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the
compelled testimony and its fruits can not be used in any manner by federal officials
in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
Id. at 79.
31. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4018 (1970).
32. 116 CONG. REc. 35291 (1970).
33. In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), stated that transactional immunity is
necessary while Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nora.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), has upheld sections 6002 and 6003.
34. 406 U.S. at 453.
35. Id.
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jurisdictional problem (Murphy dealt with a question of interjurisdic-
tional immunity while Kastigar dealt with immunity in an intrajuris-
dictional situation).36 In resolving the immunity question in favor of
use and derivative use immunity, the Court expressed the belief that
the transactional immunity Statutes in effect for the past seventy years
were wastefully broad.
The Court did not expressly overrule the holding of Counselman
that the immunity granted must be coextensive with the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege, but, on the contrary, expressly affirmed that
principle. Because of Kastigar, the Counselman case itself, along with
the other transactional statutory and case law, has been trimmed to the
more essential use and derivative use immunity of Kastigar. The prob-
lem that is seen in the Court's limiting of the Counselman decision
rather than expressly overruling that decision is that although the
decision in Kastigar is "consistent with the conceptual basis of Counsel-
man,"3 7 the immunity adopted in Kastigar is the type of immunity that
the Counselman case specifically found insufficient to replace the fifth
amendment's privilege.
Howard B. Zavodnick
TORTS-RIGHTS OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE TO SUE EACH OTHER
FOR NEGLIGENCE OF THE OTHER-DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMU-
NITY-The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the common law doc-
trine of interspousal immunity in tort actions is abrogated.
Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries sustained by her on Janu-
ary 6, 1964, while riding as passenger in an automobile driven by the
defendant. The complaint was filed on July 28, 1964. While the action
was still pending plaintiff and defendant were married on June 8, 1969.1
36. 378 U.S. at 79. The Murphy Court granted the petitioner only use and derivative
use immunity but this was in a situation where the state witness was compelled to give
testimony which might be incriminating under federal law. Since Murphy, there is now
use and derivative use immunity with respect to the federal government. The witness is
left in substantially the same position as if he had claimed the privilege while this permits
the state to secure the needed information.
37. 406 U.S. at 453.
1. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
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